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POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN NATO
I

Much has been written and said about the nature of political
consultation in NATO.

Most such references have tended to distort·

the elemental relationship among members of alliances generally
and NATO particularly.

The late Secretary of State, Dean Atheson,

who knew NATO and the realities of world politics probably as well
as any man once testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate
to the effect that an enhanced Atlantic Alliance 11 coul d be a central power house for a Free World made up of five hundred million
.

.

skilled people producing a thousand billion dollars of goods and
services annually. The potentialities of such a society are enor- ·
mous .'-' 1 In short order, Acheson jumped from an al 1 iance to a projected new society--one which presumably would follow were the all iance resuscitated so that it could perform optimally once again.
Acheson did not speak of the fqrmation of a faderal union involving the United States and other NATO members; yet, there is no
evidence that short of federation, such a new society might be born~
Alliances, including NATO cannot accomplish such transformation.
However productive an all_iance may be in terms of national security,
for example, the GNP. of the United States· or of any ally will not
.

be expressive of tne total value of goods and services produced in

Ii,
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both countries. Association in the context of an alliance does not
automatically create a new political actor.

Neither have military·

alliances created new political act~rs in the past.
An alliance is best defined as a set of states acting in concert at a given time for the mutual enhancement of the military·
security of the members vis-a-vis a specifiable adversary.

An

alliance is essentially a defensive arrangement--a compact to offer
appropriate support to·members in the·event of an attack by the external enemy.

An alliance is a loose coalition of nation-states;

it does not incorporate the policy processes of· its members •. Each ..
member's foreign policy process remains discretely independent even
with .respect to the designated enemy.

To be sure, an alliance may

be instrumental in coordinating the foreign policies of the members
to some extent and it may help to foster cooperation and identification among the members .. Treating NATO as if it incorporated the
policy processes of its members, however, is a symbolic device of
journalistic license.

Confusing the symbol (NATO} with its refer-

ent ( each member} promotes the tendency :t;o talk of NATO as if J t
were an aggregate having an identity that·is not primarily and directly a function of the several members.
NATO as a conceptualization tends to become confused wjth NATO
as an operational entity--NAT.O thus is spoken of as an actor in a
posited international system.·· As a result..of such.confusion, we
encounter propositions about the existence of a state of equilib·rium between NATO and the Warsaw Pact while· the equilibrium should
•
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more accurately be described as existing between the United States
(and allies) and the Soviet Union (and allies).

Similarly we see

~eferences to the Conference on Mutual and Balanced ~orce Reduttion
as a NATO-Wa_rsaw Pact Conference.
bi-partite but multi-partite.

Yet, the Conference will not be

This is true even were the Conference

to include all of the NATO members and all of the Warsaw members as
participants.
To be sure, a fairly extensive pattern of consultation has
developed within ttie Councils of NATO; however, it-is submitted
that this consultation is by a.nd large non-instrumental in the
sense that such consultation is not influential iri the foreign
policy decision processes of the several members.. In dealing. with
the most important area of decision making, nuclear strategic policy, it is clear that
consultation does not contribute directly to
.
.

.

American strategic planning.

.

Jens ~oyes~n, who s~rved as Norwegian

Ambassador to NATO, confronted this point quite directly in arguing
that on the elemental nuclear decisions--those that pertain to the
•

I

,

-

application of the U.S. nuclear deterrent--the United States will
not consult with her allies but that the decision- will have to rest
with the President. That responsibility cannot be shared; attempts
it shating would be dysfurictional and futile.
Boyesen's discussion related directly to the role of the small
powers in the alliance; however, his comment applies to all members
save for the United St_ates as we will note by referring to his
phrasing:

4
It is obvious that if ever a decision
to use nuclear weapons has to be made, _only
a minimum of consultation will be feasible.
The decision will have to be made by whomever has the requisite power and position
--and this means ultimately~ the President
of the_ United States. This we all accept
as a fact of life. It is something entirely
different formally to del_egate authority to
a group of foreign governments to make decisions on one's own behalf which m~y involve
the very existence of all the allied nations,
even if a way could be devised constitutionally to do this.2
Boyesen's argument is not based cih an assessment of current
or recent U.S. or other al~ied behavior in the alliance~

His is

an eloquent statement of the fundamental i nabili tY tp de 1ega te res pons i bil i ti es even when the spirit so moves ..

II
As the title indicates, this paper is principally concerned with political consultation in the alliance with respect to the go~ls of the alliance~-d~terrence of possible Soviet ~oves against
any of the allies.

The deterrent relationship that has developed

is based upon the nuclear power of the two principal adversaries,
the United States' and the Soviet Union.

NATO strategy was initially

and has remained linked to American nuclear capabflities to deliver
a crippling or fatal blow to the Soviet Union in the event of an ·
attack upon any of the NATO allies by that power.

In terms of re-

lating to the over-arching goal of deterring a Soviet threat, the
NATO ailies have been compelled to yield in effect to the United
States. on major pol icy questions.

General Vandevanter said it as

5.
· follows:
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In a very literal sense, given America 1 s role as leader

of the Free World Coalition, what is. good for the United States is
good for the Alliance; the fate of the smaller nations of Europe
depends both on the continued strength of the United States and on
the policy by which this country undertakes to guarantee the bare'
.security. 113

Although that statement was made iri 1963~ Vandevanter 1 s

assertion continues to be val id with respect to the Soviet threat.
Cleveland stated a similar concept more recently when he said that
"the policy of the United States is, for better or worse, the key 11
to maintaining a credible defense. 4
Generally speaking, policy making in an alliance requires the
unanimous consent of the members.

Alliance policy comprises the

intersection of the several national decisions--that is, the point
at which national decisions coincide is NATO policy.

NATO cannot

command, order or impose constraints upon.me,mbers .or upon their
nationals.

NATO can coordinate national commands and promote stra-

tegi~ consultation; but if it were given authority .to issue commands.
and orders binding upon the members, it would be, as it obviously is
not, supranational.

Accordingly, studying NAT0 1 s policy making pro-

cess requires emphasizing the discret.e role of the .member nations as
actors in the Alliance.

Each of the members is a sovereign state

and each enjoys the capacity to veto any pol icy issue--refusa l to
concur in a proposed action suffices to stop the action whether. that
opposition stems from the United States, France, or Luxemburg.

As

William and Annette Fox have pointed out, "the North Atlantic. Council

I
i
.I
I
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is primarily a 'decision ratifier.-•
.most a

1

planni_ng and consultative body' somewhat remote from the

centers of power.
1

Apart from that it is at the

The inability of the North Atlantic Council to

take decisions 1 (except in the form of recommendations to govern-

ments) has suited the United State's government.

The latter has, .

in any case, no fear of being bound by anything the Council might·
do, for the unanimity rule prevails,' 115
.Unanimity is very difficult to achieve in any organization; it
is yet more ~lusive when the members are sovereign states--especially
when the principal issue area of concern is.military security.

This

follows because national decision makers have tend~d to view military security as the principal mechanism for maintaining national
independence.

Attempts at giving international coalitions the

capacity to make decisions affecting national military establish~
ments gen_erally meet virtually total resistance. · Obviously, generalizations such as this have limited applicability in particular·
situation~; however, NATO's experience has borneQut the following
observations:

First,. sma 11 states have. favored pol i.ci es which rein-

force environmental continuity--they tend to favor maintaining the
system to changing it.

Second, midrange powers have sought to modify
.

.

A11 i a nee re 1a tions hips in order that they might exert more influence .
upon environing factors; hence, sometime French attempts at estab- ·
lishing a three-nation directorate (United State_s, United Kingdom,
France) to coordinate allied foreign and defense policies, and sometime British efforts at operational izing a special relationship with
the United States, etc.

7

United States I pol icy, finally, has so_ugh_t to accommodate change
so long as that cha_nge did not s_ignificantly alter the ·environment
and d1minish the relative weight of predispositional factors--that.
is, limit the options ava_ilable to the United.States.
.

.

The ·abortive

.

Multi lateral Nuclear Force (MLF), advanced by the United States,
would have created a fac;ade of change in environing conditions while
not affecting, in any way, American discretion in planning and implementing United States I nuclear strategy and tactics.
· The MLF failed to excite a11 i ed interests for varying reasons;
two of which are most important:

First, the small powers were highly

suspicious of any.moves that appeared to altet'1. the basic ~juxtaposi- ·
tion of forces within the Al l_iance.

Most notably, they opposed any

attempt to p1ace a Genna n finger on. th_e nuc 1ear trigger. .Second,_ .
the midrange powers were not attracted by the proposal since it would _
not have provided access to the really imp·ortqnt locus of strategic
planning:

the United States' dec-ision process. According _to_ Harlan

Cleveland:
The real trouble with MLF, however, was
that it did not scratch the real itch, merely
diverting attention from th_e wider issue of
nuclear sharing for a time.- At least three
fatal flaws would have killed it even if its
public relations had been ideal: the defense
of the We.st did not require yet another strategic missile system; MLF did nothing to cut ·
the Europeans in on the central decisions
about nuclear strategy and posd,ble use; and
therefore no government was really behind the
scheme.6
·
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The.policy making process of an alliance is very complex, providing so .many opportunities for interruption and veto as to atteJ'luate its decision-making capabilities.

Indeed, one is tempted to

say that it is virtually impossible for an alliance such as NATO
to inake pol icy.

This should not seem too surprising since· NATO has

made very little policy in the truest meaning of the term.·
NATO's principal policy functions are more·consultative than
creative, more communicative than innovative, and tend to be more
peripheral than central to the diverse concerns of the members. To
be sure, NATO ha.s occasio_nally been charged with adopting important
policy positioni; however, such occasions have been exc~ptional.

III
Identifying and measuring the concrete beneri ts flowing to
.

.

.

the members as a result of the NATO policy-making process is virtually an impossible task.

Indeed,. identifying and measuring sig-

nificant levels of common interest beyond that which nurtured the
Alliance in the firs,t place--the threat of Soviet military aggresfon
againsfWestern Europe~-is so difficult as to frustrate any attempts
at precision.

And that threat is perceived as diminishing or having

been diminished to the point of latency.

The one i ssue-a·rea· whe~e

clear policy decisions have been made by NATO is. that which dea·1s
directly with questions relating to modes of meeting the ~thr_eat were
it to become active. - Such policies have been arrived ~t by means ·

of following the American lead--United States I strategy has been
Alliance strategy.·

9

Had NATO been charged with planni_ng and impl ementi_ng strategic
policies, it would have been an abject failure.

It would have failed

for want of an executive power. to order compliance with riew approaches
and procedures.

It would have failed for want of the taxing a_uthority

necessary for generating funds and enforcing priorities.

And it would

have failed for want of strategic and· tactical forces that could be
/

dep1loyed without national consent.
NATO does, however, provide a. conti,:iuing forum for consultation
among the all"ies on questions relating to s·trategic policies.

Cleve-

land's insightful study presentsnumer-ous illustrations.of specific
instances of consultation. ·He.asserts that consultation leads to sub~tantial levels of cooperation and identification _among the allies,
particularly regarding issue-areas most direi:tly affected by rapid
scientific and technological change~
Th_e real test of the consultative process is the extent to
which governments are willing to communicate fully about present
and prospective plans.

The Skybolt case illustrates very well that, ·

at varfous stages, Secretary of· D.efense McNamara was reluctant to
with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Secretary of State' Rusk,
communicate
'
.
.

\

or President Kennedy--much less the United Kingdom.· By the time
the United States was ready to communicate with _the British government,. the . decision -was a fait accompli.
.

11

As Cleveland
has said:
.
.

Even close allies do not consult each other any

more than they

have to._ For each government, there are clear and present inhibitions to sharing with other its analyses of a delicate s·ituation,
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its information about diplomatic contacts, and esp·ecially the opportunity to influence its own ·natiorial.policy. 11]
The consultation process is seriously weakened by the removal_
of si.tuational analyses, diplomatic contacts, and national policy
questions from allied consideration.

What remains for the Alliance

is post facto deliberation of diverse national policies which may
be more or less complementary and parallel.

Such.deliberations do~

however, provide useful i nforma ti on about a 11 i ed reactions to ·national policies and may affect the development of subsequent national policies.
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)' illustrates the ambiguity inherent in the Alliance's consultative process.

The NPG was designed

to avoid some of the pitfalls that blocked the MLF by focusing upon
.

'

nuclear policy;rather than hardware:1 and upon smal1-group consultation rather than multinational operatio_ns.

As first proposed b.y

Secretary McNamara in May, 1965, there would have be~n a five-nation
"select committee" who would "learn enough about atomic realities
to par ti ci pate with us in judgments on how to use this unprecedented
weaponry for deterrence and defense. 11 8
By the time the -proposal was implemented, the five-member select
cormnittee became
the ten-member Special Committee encompassing three
,
.

.

.

working groups on crisis management, communications, and nuclear plan.

ning.

.
.

.

.

This arrangement was suppl anted in December~ 1966, by the Nuclear

Defense Affairs Committee {including all members save for France~ Iceland, and Luxembourg) ·and the now seven-nation Nuclear Planning Group.·

11
NPG's consultative amb_iguity results from its role in sharing
informat~on while not sharing in the .:maki_ng· ·of nuclear decisions~. ·
Consultation in such instances is cominunicative, not decisive--the
outcomes of such activities may be reflected in decisions or they
may be ignored; despite Cleveland's contention that such consultation becames inextricably part of the United States' decision process:
II

. we are now giving our European allies so much information and

creati_ng so many occasions for them to come forward with their ideas,
· the·ir papers, and their proposals that it is hard for· them to feel

j

let alone complain out loud, that they are not 'participating in
nuclear planning. 1119
During NATO's first decade, the United States rarely consulted
her allies about strategic actions directed at regions beyo_nd NATO's
territorial jurisdiction, even when such actions affected .NATO strategy or American Alliance policy .. Once consultatfons were undertaken,
European reactions were rarely, if ever, internalized .into the American decision~making process.lo Attempts at obtaining NATO support
for American policy in such foreign areas were equally unavailing.
Thus, the United States fa i_l ed to get support for :embargoes upon
tra~ing with Cuba and Mainland China or for American policy in Vietnam.

Cleveland implies that had the United States consulted before

escalating in Vietnam, decisions to escalate might not have been
made:

IIIt is tempting to speculate whether decisions on other mat-

ters which were not subjected to serious international consultation
-~the successive escalations in Vietnam are again the obviou.s example
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--would. have been better decisions if we had had to discuss them
with fore.igners.

Even with a complex and many-sided. decision-

making proc_ess, it is comparatively easy for any go.vernll'lent to
.

.

- - .-

kid itself; it is always much harder to kid foreigners. 11

ll

Tempt-

ing as it may be, such speculation is idle, -if not specious, un- less one can identify points of entry into- the U.S. decision process for the consequences of such consultations.
· Alliances are not particularly viable 1nstr-uments for generating common interests or for effectively coordinating the foreign
policies of the members.

The NATO experience is not unique:

the

League of Arab States, _for example, has been singularly unsuccessful in going beyond designating the common enemy.

The Arab League

has not succeeded in coordinating policies or planning strategies
or ev~n in preventing overt intra~alliance hostilities.

The SEATO

policy process has not been instrumental in coordinating allied
policies in Southeast Asia despite American attempts at invoking
the SEATO treaty as a legal justification for United States' involvement.

And bilateral alliances may not be appreciably more

successful in generating common interests or in coordinating policies beyond those for-which the alliance was first formed.

The

Japanese-American Alliance, for example, was ignored when President.
Nixon made his dramatic overture to China in 1971.
A related question arises as to the efficacy of alliances in_
terms of policy implementation.

Normally. the question is moot since·

alliances tend not to make policy.

NATO's experience indicates that

13
by and large policies have been impl_emented by the allies.

The crit-

ical test, however, would be the behavior of the members in the event
of a Soviet attack. · _Would they respond promptly and effectivel.y?
so, would the alliance have sufficient capability to resist
successfully?
.

an

If

attack

If the alliance really represents the interest, held
.

.

in common by the allies,or responding promptly and effectively, one
might be reasonably confident· that appropriate action would be taken.
· If, on the other hand, one or more of the members pa rtic i pates in the
alliance because of side-payments and not because of shar_ed interest,
the answer is far less clear---indeed, it may be unpredictable, hence
undependable.

Confidence in.such an alliance might well be undermined.

In ~ sense, all alliances are somewhat unpredictable, but some
are more unpredictable than others.

The North Atlantic Treaty re-

.' quires its members to take appropriate action but does not specify
what that action might be.

Short-of giving NATO authority to order

troops into combat at a .time and place and against an enemy to. be
specified by the organiiation, such decisions will remain the responsibilities of the several members.

The credibility of the al-

liance therefore depends upon the wil 1i ngnes~ of th_e several members
to l.ive up to their responsibilities.· Pare~theti~ally, it has not
been unknown· in history for· natioris to fail to live up to their alliance commitments.
Growing r_estiveness towards American unilateralism combined
with c:oncern about the shift to flexible resp?nse generated a crisis
1

of confidence in United States' credibility in the early 1960 s.
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The problem was not so much the cred_i_bili_ty of the American commit-.
JDent as of the American response. · Would the United States consult
with the European allies in defining the s_ituation in the event of_
a Soviet challenge?. Would the· United States choose to try to limit
· a response ·to conventional forces in West Germany?

If so, the pr1ce

of defending Western Europe-might be.the laying waste of Germany
--hardly palatable to the Germans.

Would unilateral American chal-

lenges to the Russians, such as in the Cuban missile crisis, invblv.e
NATO in conflicts beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty?
_ More recently, the wa-r in Vietnam has raised questions not
alone concerning United States• unil~teralism but of the judgment
of American officials who may be charged wi_th defining commitments
. and exercising leadership.

Specifically the question· arises as to

_the effects of overcommitment and to· modes of determining priori ti es
among possibly comp~ting commitments.

One of the possible side-

effects of the Vietnam war may yet be a reduction of options resulting in.lim.iting the flexibility of an _American response to a Soviet
challenge.

IV:
One· is tempted to conclude that the NATO consul tat ion process
is effective since there is so much consultative activjty.

Yet we

know that all activi.ty is not equally purposeful or in~trumental.
The critical. question is to what end is all this activity leading?_
~ctivi ty for the· sake of activity may help keep some pebpl e gainfully

15
emp.loyed; but it .may have little more socially redeemi_ng value.
Cleveland's notion that the NATO policy process shapes national
policy does not appear grounded in NATO history or practice.
_ Despite much recent rhetoric, the. principal actors in international relations are nation states who value their national independence· higher than cooperation and higher than interdependence. ·
If it makes sense at time X to enter into an alliance with state B
a·gainst adversary D, such an alliance may be entered in to.

ai

As soon

that alliance does not make sense,. it is ended~ whether or not

the treaty or various ancil 1ary structures remain·;

Attempts at

resuscitation will be unavailing unless the basic logic survived.
As was noted above, governments do not share information well
· intranationally much less internationally .. Membership in.alliances
does not change this fact regardless of levels of institutionaliza,..
tion and structure .. This holds for NATO as well as -for other alliances despite the fact that NATO has generated niore ·cooperation
and sharing than have other alliances.
But it is important to bear in mind that that ievel of sharing
is Within a context of muth more limited cooperation.

On_the basic

..

- question of NATO's strategic policy, litt_le if any· significant cooperation is evidenced before the fact.

NATO strategy remains U.S.

strategy and NATO continues to adapt to the vagaries. of U.S .. policy;
the rever_se does not occur.

i
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As thi_ngs stand now and for the foreseeable future, the USSR
and the Peoples' Republic.of China may be far more.influential in
shaping US strategic policy than America 1 s European allies.

The

..

Nixon-Kissinger approach to .world politics is rooted in the notion
that they who hold the ·power bear- the responsibility f9r m~intain:ing international order.

The foci of· power rest upon Moscow~ Peking

and Washington, not upon London, Bonn, Paris and Brussels.

Or

·Tokyo, for that matter.
·Tlie administration's litany includes Western Europe and Japan
but actions belie the words; else 11 Nixon Shock 11 would have been
11

Nixon Tact. 11

-_

For Western Eurqpe to become a primary actor in this

new global coalition, it will have to demonstrat~ greater power
than may 1i kely accompany diverse national policies, especially
as they ar~ tied to U.S. strategy.

Were a united Europe to arise

from.the present community (whether expanded further ·or riot), the
.

.

new entity would have sufficient power to share the burdens of
res pons i bi 1i ty.

Unti 1 then, Europe is consigned a secondary role

whi_le enjoying the benefits of vicarious responsibil,ity-sharing.
.

.

Even then, consultation would be after the fact.

Only the

creation of a supranational politico-military organ with jurisdict1on. over the U.S. strategic policy process wou1d suffice to
g_enera~e consultation in planning.
'

.

.

And there is no basis for
.. -

speculation much less .for planning for such an eventuality.:

!
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